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I. 
THE UTAH STATUTES REIMPLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY 
DC NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN GREGG V. GEORGIA, 
PROFFITT V, FLORIDA, AND JUREK V. TEXAS* 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that 
direct review by Appellate Courts of the appropriateness of 
each death sentence case is a crucial procedure which must be 
employed in any capital punishment scheme in order to satisfy 
1 
the requirements of Furman v. Georgia, 
In these cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
principles first announced in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972). As Justice Stewart stated in Gregg v. Georgia: 
"Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded 
a sentencing body on a matter so grave or the deter-
mination of whether a human life should be taken or 
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed 
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly 
arbitrary or capricious action." 96 S. Ct. at 2932. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart, in announcing 
the judgement of the court, stated that because of the uniqueness 
of the death penalty, it cannot be imposed under any sentencing 
procedure that creates a substantial risk that it may be inflicted 
in an arbitrary or capricious manner. In reviewing the capital 
penalty statute of the State of Georgia, the court, at several 
1. Gregg v. Georgia, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976); 
Jurek v. Texas, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976); 
Roberts V. Louisiana, U. S. , 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976). 
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points in the opinion, emphasized the function of the special 
expedited direct review of capital cases which was followed 
by the Georgia Supreme Court. A plurality of the Justices 
acknowledged that these special review procedures consti-
tuted an important additional safeguard to check the possibility 
2 
of the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 
Under the law of Georgia, the appellate court 
is required by statute to automatically review each sentence 
of death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence 
of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the 
jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and 
whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to sentences 
3 
imposed in similar cases. The Georgia Supreme Court in Coley 
v. State, 231 Ga. 329, 204 S. E. 2d 612 (1974) has held that 
a death sentence will be set aside on the appellate level if 
excessive in light of comparative sentences imposed for 
similar cases. 
The Court placed great emphasis on the ability of 
the Georgia Supreme Court to determine in each case whether 
the death sentence is excessive or disproportional. As Justice 
Stewart stated: 
"The proportionality review substantially eliminates 
the possibility that a person will be sentenced to 
die by the action of an aberrant jury. 96 S. Ct. 2940." 
2. See the concurring opinion of Justice White, with whom the 
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined. 
3. Georgia Code Ann. Section 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975). 
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4 
In Proffit v. Florida, the death penalty statute 
of Florida provides for sentencing in all cases by the trial 
judge instead of a jury and required automatic review by the 
5 
Supreme Court of Florida of all death sentence cases. The 
trial judge, not the jury, in sentencing under Florida!s 
system must justify the imposition in every case of the death 
sentence with written findings to the State Supreme Court, 
In State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (1973) , the Florida Supreme 
Court held that they had the duty on appellate review of 
capital cases that went beyond the scope of review in other 
criminal cases. The court stated that Supreme Court review 
should guarantee that aggravating and mitigating reasons 
present in one case lead to a similar result to that reached 
under similar circumstances in another case and the appellate 
court must determine whether or not the punishment of death 
in any individual case is too great. 
The United States Supreme Court in upholding the 
Florida death penalty scheme under Furman placed great 
emphasis on these review procedures. The Court stated that 
the conscientious review by a court with state-wide jurisdiction 
4. Supra,, Page 1. 
5c Fla. State. Ann., Sec. 921.141(4) (Supp. 1976-1977). 
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would assure the consistency, fairness, and rationality that 
would prevent the imposition of the death sentence in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner. The Court noted that because 
the procedure developed by the Florida court, the Florida 
court had in effect adopted the type of proportionality 
6 
review mandated in the Georgia statute at issue in Gregg. 
In Texas, the conviction of death is subject to 
7 
automatic review by the Texas Court of Criminal Apoeals. 
8 
In Smith v. State, the Court of Appeals of Texas examined 
carefully the death sentence imposed in that case as to the 
appropriateness of its imposition in light of the prior 
history of the defendant. In Jurek v. Texas the Supreme 
Court found that the Texas appellate procedure provided 
means which would promote the evenhanded, rational, and 
consistent imposition of the death penalty in that state. 
In Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the death sentence as applied 
in North Carolina was unconstitutional because the mandatory 
death penalty system violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. An important factor in this decision by the 
court was the absence in North Carolina of the proper appellate 
review process. In North Carolina the court found that neither 
6. Proffitt v. Florida at 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976), 
7. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 (1973). 
8. No. 49,809 (Feb. 18, 1976). 
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at the trial or appellate level could the judiciary check 
the arbitrary and capricious exercise of the sentencing 
9 
in death penalty cases. 
The Utah statutes, Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and 
76-3-207 (Supp. 1975) do not outline an appellate review process 
which meets the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Under the 
scope of review employed in the State of Utah in criminal 
cases, this court has no means to promote the evenhanded, 
rational, and consistent imposition of the death penalty on 
a statewide basis. Furthermore, the appeal procedure in 
Utah is discretionary, not mandatory and automatic as in 
each of the three cases before the Supreme Court. 
Therefore, the sentence of the appellant imposed 
under their capital punishment statutory scheme is unconsti-
tutional and should be reversed. 
9. See also, Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, at 96 S. Ct. 
300 7 re appellate review. 
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II. 
POINT II. THE DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE 
IT DOES NOT SERVE A COMPELLING STATE 
INTEREST WHICH COULD NOT BE FULFILLED 
BY A LESS DRASTIC MEANS 
The appellant hereby incorporates Point II of 
original brief. 
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III. 
POINT III. APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE WHICH 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL SHOULD BE REVERSED, 
AND PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3-207 (4) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO 
THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE APPELLANT TO 
BE SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
The appellant hereby incorporates Point III 
of original brief. 
- 7 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AMENDED IV 
A) THE SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
THE SENTENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE 
AND EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE 
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AND THE DEFENDANT'S INVOLVEMENT IN 
THAT OFFENSE. 
B) THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
JUDGES IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. 
C) THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO WARRANT IMPOSITION OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
The appellant submits that if the court should 
find that the death penalty statute in Utah is not per se 
unconstitutional, the aforementioned recent decisions by 
the Supreme Court require that this court exercise the type 
of special, direct review of death penalty cases specified by the 
Supreme Court. 
As outlined in Amended Point I of this brief, a 
mandatory, special, direct review of the appropriateness of 
each individual death sentence is a crucial procedure that 
must be employed to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Paragraph (3) of Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207 
(Supp. 1975) provides: 
"Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence 
is^of death/the supreme court, if it finds prejudicial 
error in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside 
the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial 
court, in which event the trial court shall impose the 
sentence of life imprisonment." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under the above quoted section, this court has the 
ability to exercise the obligation placed upon state appellate 
courts by the United States Supreme Court to assure that the 
death penalty in Utah is not inflicted in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner. By reviewing each case in which the penalty 
of death is imposed, this court can determine whether in fact 
the sentence of the individual defendant is or is not dispro-
portional to the offense committed. In each case the court 
should review the sentence in light of the circumstances of 
the crime, the aggravating and mitigating factors present, 
and other sentences for similar crimes. The court by employing 
"proportionality review" can substantially eliminate the pos-
sibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action 
of an arbitrary or capricious manner. 
This court also has the duty to carefully review 
the entire trial and sentencing procedure of each death penalty 
case and to reverse the death sentence if any prejudicial 
error is found by the court in any phase of the trial. As 
the United States Supreme Court stated in Gregg: 
"There is no question that death as a punishment 
is unique in its severity and irrevocability... 
When a defendant's life is at stake, the court 
has been particularly sensitive to insure that 
every safeguard is observed. 96 S, Ct. at 2932. 
The Utah Supreme Court has traditionally employed 
a special review standard in capital cases. State v. Riley, 
41 Utah 2d 225, 126 P. 294 (1911); State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 
350, 2 P. 2d 1050 (1931); State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 
-9-
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2d 1003 (1944); and State v. Materi, 119 Utah 143, 225 P. 
2d 325 (1950). In these cases the court has held that it 
has a duty to review the entire record that does not exist 
in ordinary criminal appeals, and will raise questions of 
error on its own motion. In State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 
230, 282 P. 2d 323 (1955) this court said: 
"Under such circumstances (a capital case) it is 
our duty to scrutinize with care the propriety of 
all aspects of the proceedings, at 332." 
The court expressed this concept again in State v. 
Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 (1968) in another manner 
in reversing one defendant's death sentence: 
"... with the defendant's life at stake, 
this court should not hazard a guess. The 
[evidence at issue] could very well have 
tipped the scales in favor of the death 
penalty" at 515. 
In light of the foregoing standards of review the 
appellant submits: (1) That the penalty of death in appellant's 
case is disproportionate and excessive in relation to the offense 
which the defendant was convicted and the defendant's involve-
ment in the offense; (2) The evidence introduced at the trial 
and hearing and sentence does not support the sentence of death 
in light of the mitigating factors present in appellant's case. 
In the appellant's case, the trial judge sentenced 
all of the defendants to death primarily on the basis of the 
fact that the crime itself was "brutal, malicious and ruthless". 
Judge Sheya in announcing his decision said: 
-i n _ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"if this is not a case warranting death, . 
when you consider the facts that a man 
was murdered, taken out of his bed, prac-
tically at midnight without any justification, 
cause or excuse, whatsoever, and murdered in 
the manner that this man was, ruthlessly and 
brutally, it is hard to imagine a case that 
would warrant the death penalty." (T650) 
The brutality or heinousness of the crime, which so 
influenced the trial judge is not an aggravating circumstance 
which the Utah legislature has specified as a condition war-
ranting the imposition of first degree murder or an aggravating 
factor to be considered in sentencing. 
The only statutorily enumerated aggravating factor 
which was involved in this case is that the homicide was 
committed while the actor was engaged in a kidnapping. How-
ever, the evidence indicates that any kidnapping or detention 
of the victim was merely incidental. If not for the detention 
and transportation of the victim before the homicide the 
crime would not have been elevated to first degree murder from 
second degree and the appellant would not now be facing the 
death penalty. This is not the usual case of a kidnapping 
where a collateral homicide is accomplished to facilitate 
the kidnapping. 
On the other hand, the following evidence of 
statutory mitigating factors was introduced during the trial 
and hearing on sentence by the defense. 
The appellant, Irvin Dunsdon, did not have any 
significant history of prior criminal activity. During the 
hearing, the appellant testified that at the time of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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incident he was employed and was working as a journeyman 
painter. (T. 580) The appellant testified that his only 
previous criminal conviction was for a misdemeanor of 
being an accessory after the fact of theft in Indiana. 
(T. 599) The State offered no evidence of any other previous 
criminal activity by the appellant and thus this mitigating 
factor stands unrebutted. 
The trial court did not have before it the 
accurate sentencing information which the Supreme Court 
in Gregg v. Georgia said was an indispensable prerequisite 
to a reasoned determination of whether the defendant should 
live or die. 96 S. Ct. at 2933. If the appellant had com-
mitted a felony on the Third Degree the court would have 
had substantially more information through the pre-sentence 
report procedure normally available to the court. 
At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
appellant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was 
substantially impaired as the result of intoxication by 
both alcohol and drugs. The evidence showed that the apel-
lant prior to the party which they attended on April 8, 19 75, 
had smoked three !fjoints" of marijuana with his girlfriend. 
(T. 582) At the party he testified that he had consumed 
about 10 cups of beer during the course of the evening. 
(T. 582) Also, he had taken four of the "Valium" pills 
at the party. (T. 582) The appellant stated on cross-
-1 2-
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examination that "we was both pretty high...We was 
stumbling and staggering all night during the whole thing'1. 
(T. 593) He also testified chac he had trouble driving 
the truck. The fact that there was a great quantity of 
both drugs and alcohol at the party on the evening of April 8 
and that the appellant was drinking and taking pills was 
corroborated by the testimony of several witnesses. (T. 492f 
T. 493, T. 508). Furthermore, an expert called by the defense 
testified that the effect of the drugs taken and alcohol con-
sumed (was) would be exaggerated because they were combined. 
(T. 544) He testified that the combination of beer and 
"valium" usually results in abnormally aggressive behavior 
and a distortion of judgment. (T. 545) 
The only evidence offered by the prosecution to 
negate this evidence was the testimony of several of the 
police officers who were present when the defendants were 
subsequently arrested on the morning of April 9, after the 
affects of the drugs and alcohol had dissipated. 
The evidence clearly shows that the appellant's 
actions on the morning of April 9 were substantially impaired 
as the direct result of his intoxicated state. Section 76-3-208 
(1) (d) of the capital punishment provisions is unique in its 
consideration for voluntary intoxication in the Utah Criminal 
Code. The general rule as stated in Utah Code Annotated 76-2-306 
(Supp. 1975) is that voluntary intoxication is not a defense 
unless it negates the existence of the necessary mental state. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah does not mitigate first or second degree homicide on 
the basis of "diminished capacity" resulting from intoxication. 
C. F. Utah Code Annotated 76-5-205 (Supp. 1975). The unique-
ness of Section 76-3-208(1) (d) indicates a legislative intent 
that the severity of the penalty of death should be mitigated 
by the fact of substantial intoxication in sentencing even 
when voluntary intoxication would not be available to mitigate 
the finding of guilt. 
The appellant was an accomplice in the murder 
committed by the defendant, Marvel, and his participation 
was relatively minor. The appellant never intended to 
kill the victim when he went to his home. (T. 5 90) He 
admitted when he was on the stand that he had intended 
to "maybe punch him around a bit", when they went to 
Hogan's house. (t. 587) He testified that on the evening 
of April 8 he struck the victim and he had "fell" to the 
ground. (T. 588) The appellant testified that as the 
victim was running down the driveway, Craig Marvel shot 
the defendant. (T. 588) This was the first time he 
realized that something other than a fist fight was taking 
place. (T. 590) The testimony of the other defendants cor-
robate the fact that there was no planning or premeditation 
of the shooting that evening. After the shot was fired, the 
appellant testified that he was "paranoid and scared" and 
thought the victim was dead. (T. 588) While the shots were 
being fired in the canyon by Marvel, the appellant v/as turning 
the truck around in the snow. (T. 595) 
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The evidence shows that the appellant was unwit-
tingly involved in an incident which he had not anticipated 
or planned. Furthermore, the degree of his involvement as 
an accomplice should be viewed in light of his intoxicated 
condition. 
The appellant submits that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in finding the appellant guilty 
of First Degree Murder and in sentencing the appellant to 
death. Furthermore, the appellant submits that his is not 
a case for the imposition of the death penalty. 
Therefore, the court should reverse the judgement 
of the lower court and either remand the case for retrial 
or set aside the death penalty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
RANDALL T. GAITHER 
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